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I. INTRODUCTION 
In its highly anticipated and long-awaited decision, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled by plurality that the state’s 
whistleblower statute did not protect an in-house lawyer who was 
terminated after reporting unlawful activity to his employer.1  By 
affirming the decision of the court of appeals, the court effectively 
overturned the plaintiff’s $197,000 jury award, not inclusive of costs 
and attorney’s fees.2  Notably, an overwhelming majority of the 
court concluded that in-house attorneys—or, for that matter, any 
employee tasked with reporting illegal or suspected illegal conduct 
as part of her job—do deserve the protections of the Minnesota 
Whistleblower Act, section 181.932 of the Minnesota Statutes.3  
 
       †   J.D., University of Minnesota; B.A., University of Pennylvania.  Adam 
Klarfeld is an associate attorney with the law firm of Ford & Harrison LLP in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and primarily represents employers in employment 
litigation matters. 
 1. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 231 (Minn. 2010).   
 2. Id. at 221.  
 3. Compare id. at 226–27, with Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108–09 
(Ill. 1991) (refusing to extend the tort of retaliatory discharge to in-house 
1
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Unfortunately, the plurality opinion leaves Minnesota courts and 
practitioners without a framework for analyzing whistleblower 
claims made by employees with these general job responsibilities. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Sybaritic, Inc. manufactures and sells spa equipment.4  Plaintiff 
Brian Kidwell was hired as the company’s in-house general counsel 
in July 2004.5  In this capacity, Kidwell was broadly responsible for 
providing counsel “as to all corporate legal matters, and [for] the 
general legal administration of activities at Sybaritic.”6  He also 
worked directly on at least one litigation matter, serving as the 
counsel of record in the company’s patent lawsuit against a 
competitor.7  Concerned about the company’s “pervasive culture of 
dishonesty” Kidwell wrote an e-mail to the company’s management 
team titled “A Difficult Duty,” outlining multiple instances of 
allegedly illegal conduct that he believed Sybaritic was failing to 
address.8  In part, the e-mail addressed his concerns over his 
perceived discovery violations in the patent litigation.9   
Kidwell concluded the e-mail by cautioning that, as the 
company’s attorney, he would be obligated to send a report to the 
appropriate authorities if the company refused to comply with its 
legal obligations.10  “[He] also sent a copy of the email [sic] to his 
father, a retired businessman” whose advice about the situation he 
had already sought.11  Sybaritic’s management team developed a 
plan with Kidwell the following day to resolve the issues in the e-
mail.12  Nevertheless, Sybaritic fired Kidwell three weeks later, 
citing, among other things, its distrust of him after discovering the 
e-mail to his father.13   
 
attorneys). 
 4. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 221.   
 5. Id.   
 6. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s employment agreement with the company).   
 7. Id. at 223. 
 8. Id. at 221–22.   
 9. Id. at 222. 
 10. Id. at 222–23. 
 11. Id. at 223. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 223–24.  Sybaritic also claimed that it had “experienced a series of 
problems with Kidwell over the three-week period following receipt of the 
‘Difficult Duty’ email [sic],” including failure to finish work after claiming the 
work was completed, and taking vacation time without completing a job task.  Id. 
at 224. 
2
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This litigation ensued.  Kidwell alleged that he was terminated 
in violation of the Minnesota Whistleblower Act.14  “Sybaritic 
counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty based on Kidwell’s 
forwarding the difficult-duty e-mail to his father.”15  The jury agreed 
with both parties, finding that Kidwell was fired because he 
engaged in protected conduct under the statute and that he had 
breached his fiduciary duty to the company.16  The jury awarded 
Kidwell $197,000 in total damages and awarded the company 
nothing on its breach of fiduciary claim, concluding that the 
company did not suffer any damages as a result of the breach.17  
After the district court denied Sybaritic’s post-trial motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, Sybaritic appealed.18   
III. THE APPELLATE COURT’S DECISION 
Agreeing with the majority of jurisdictions,19 the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals concluded that Kidwell’s claim was not “per se 
barred by the so-called attorney-client defense.”20  The company 
argued that an in-house attorney was precluded as a matter of law 
from bringing retaliatory discharge claims against an employer “on 
the premise that a lawsuit by an attorney against a former client 
would be inherently inconsistent with an attorney’s duty to not 
reveal client confidences.”21  In rejecting Sybaritic’s argument, the 
court of appeals recognized that the “majority view” permitted in-
house attorneys to sue, provided that the claims “do not run afoul 
of the duty of confidentiality (a proviso that potentially could be 
applied as a bar).”22  Nevertheless, the court of appeals held that 
Kidwell was barred from bringing a whistleblower claim because 
“he wrote and sent the difficult-duty e-mail to fulfill his job 
 
 14. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 855, 860 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).  
 15. Id.   
 16. Id.   
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The Minnesota Court of Appeals found that “[t]he majority view . . . 
appears to reject the attorney-client defense.”  Id. at 863–64.  (citing Crews v. 
Buckman Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 857, 863 (Tenn. 2002); Gen. Dynamics 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994)).  However, the court also 
pointed out that it found only one other case involving a statutory whistleblower 
claim to address the issue.  Kidwell, 749 N.W.2d at 864 (citing Parker v. M & T 
Chem., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220–21 (N.J. 1989)). 
 20. Kidwell, 749 N.W.2d at 864. 
 21. Id. at 861. 
 22. Id. at 864.   
3
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responsibilities.”23   
IV. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
Rejecting the reasoning of the court of appeals, but approving 
its holding, the Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately sided with the 
company.24  The plurality opinion explicitly noted that “[t]he 
whistleblower statute does not contain any limiting language that 
supports the blanket job duties exception the court of appeals 
crafted.”25  Nevertheless, the court stated that it would “not go so 
far as to hold that an employee’s job duties are irrelevant in 
determining whether an employee has engaged in protected 
conduct.”26  Instead, the court stated that protected reports must be 
made in “good faith” as required by the statute.27  In order for a 
report to have been made in “good faith,” it must be “made for the 
purpose of exposing an illegality and not a vehicle, identified after 
the fact, to support a belated whistle-blowing claim.”28  The court 
reasoned that because the “‘central question’ is whether the report 
was made ‘for the purpose of blowing the whistle, i.e. to expose an 
illegality,’” that an employee’s job duties should be examined for 
purposes of determining whether the report was made in good 
faith.29   
Relying on federal precedent interpreting the federal 
Whistleblower Protection Act (the “WPA”), the court held that 
“[a]n employee cannot be said to have ‘blown the whistle’ when 
the employee’s report is made because it is the employee’s job to 
investigate and report wrongdoing.”30  According to the plurality, 
an employee who has responsibility for investigating and reporting 
potentially unlawful behavior may still qualify for protection under 
the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, but “that employee will need 
something more than the report itself” to satisfy the good faith 
 
 23. Id. at 867 (noting that in the e-mail, Kidwell wrote “I cannot fail to write 
this e-mail without also failing to do my duty to the company and to my profession 
as an attorney.”).  At trial, Kidwell testified that he had to write the e-mail because 
he was “the person responsible for the legal affairs of the company.”  Id. 
 24. See Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Minn. 2010).   
 25. Id. at 226. 
 26. Id. at 227. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (quoting Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000)).  
 29. Id. (quoting Obst, 614 N.W.2d at 202). 
 30. Id. at 228 (referencing Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).   
4
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requirement of the statute.31  The court cited the examples in 
Huffman as “a non-exhaustive illustration of ways in which an 
employee’s job duties could inform the question of ‘good faith’ 
under the whistleblower statute.”32  
With respect to Kidwell, the court evaluated the record and 
ruled that he was merely performing his general job duties in 
drafting the e-mail.33  The plurality found “that as in-house general 
counsel he was ‘responsible for providing advice on any legal affairs 
of the company.’”34  According to the court, the text of the e-mail 
confirmed that Kidwell’s intent was to warn his client about the 
potential liability arising from its actions, and that he was only 
raising some of his concerns in part as the “attorney of record” in 
the patent litigation.35  Thus, according to the plurality, Kidwell’s 
purpose in sending the e-mail “was not to ‘expose an illegality,’ but 
was to provide legal advice to his client.”36  Because Kidwell failed to 
show that he sent the report “for the purpose of exposing an 
illegality,” he was not entitled to protection under the Minnesota 
Whistleblower Act.37 
V. THE CONCURRING OPINION 
Chief Justice Magnuson concurred in the result, but disagreed 
with the plurality’s reasoning.38  According to Chief Justice 
Magnuson, Kidwell was precluded from any recovery because he 
breached his fiduciary duty to his client.39  He noted that attorneys 
 
 31. Id.   
 32. Id. at 228 n.7.  Notably, the Huffman court provided examples in which an 
employee with investigatory responsibilities may garner the protection of the 
federal WPA, two of which are important here.  First, an employee who reports the 
“wrongdoing outside of normal channels” is entitled to protection because the 
WPA’s “core purposes are served by such a disclosure.”  Huffman, 263 F.3d at 1354.  
Second, the Huffman court permitted WPA protection for an employee who is 
obligated to report the wrongdoing, “but such a report is not part of the 
employee’s normal duties or the employee has not been assigned those duties.”  
Id. 
 33. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 230. 
 34. Id. (quoting Kidwell’s testimony).   
 35. Id. (quoting Kidwell’s “Difficult Duty” e-mail).  According to the plurality, 
Kidwell sent the “Difficult Duty” e-mail in an attempt to warn his client about 
possible federal law violations if the client did not conform to discovery 
obligations.  Id.   
 36. Id.   
 37. Id. at 231. 
 38. Id. at 231–34 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 232. 
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are permitted to bring whistleblower claims; however, any 
disclosure of client confidences must be made within “the fiduciary 
obligations imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct.”40  Thus, 
an in-house attorney is afforded the protections of Minnesota’s 
whistleblower statute, but she should only “reveal information to the 
extent necessary to establish her claim against her employer.”41  
Finally, Chief Justice Magnuson stated that the jury’s award of zero 
damages was irrelevant in the retaliation context since “‘the client 
is deemed injured even if no actual loss results.’”42   
VI. THE DISSENT 
The three justices making up the dissent stated that the 
plurality opinion “imposes an artificial evidentiary hurdle on 
proving mental state and fails to give proper deference to the jury’s 
determination of subjective intent.”43  More specifically, the dissent 
contended that the plurality’s reliance on Huffman was misplaced 
because the plurality failed to establish why the WPA and the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Act should be treated similarly.44  It 
asserted that other federal whistleblower statutes, such as Sarbanes-
Oxley, provide support for in-house attorneys not needing to go 
beyond their normal job duties to garner protection from 
retaliation.45  Notably absent from the dissent was any explanation 
of why the Minnesota Whistleblower Act should not be read 
similarly to these other whistleblower protection statutes.46   
The dissent reasoned that juries are capable of determining 
whether an employee has the subjective intent to “blow the 
whistle,” and therefore they are capable of determining whether 
the report was made in good faith, i.e., for the purpose of 
“exposing an illegality.”47  In the present case, the dissent 
concluded that the evidence supported the jury’s determination 
that Kidwell “made a good faith report that was protected by the 
 
 40. Id. at 233. 
 41. Id. (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
01-424 (2001)). 
 42. Id. at 234 (quoting Perl v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 
209, 212 (Minn. 1984)).   
 43. Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 236–37.   
 45. Id. at 237. 
 46. Id.   
 47. Id. at 237–39. 
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Minnesota Whistleblower Act.”48   
Finally, the dissent disposed of Chief Justice Magnuson’s 
concurring opinion by arguing that the opinion “employs a narrow 
reading of Rule 1.6 of the Minnesota Rules of Professional 
Conduct” because the rule contemplates whistleblower claims after 
2005.49  Thus, the dissent concluded that although clients may 
terminate the attorney-client relationship, “this does not remove an 
in-house attorney’s right to sue under some circumstances.”50   
VII.  ANALYSIS 
The most striking part of the Kidwell opinion is what the 
justices failed to address.  All seven justices assumed, without 
discussion, that in-house attorneys may bring retaliation claims just 
like other employees.51  Even without a majority opinion, this 
conclusion may constitute binding precedent.52  Additionally, the 
plurality and the dissent agreed that Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act 
does not create a “blanket job duties exception.”53  However, the 
dissent and plurality opinions agreed that examining the purported 
whistleblower’s job duties is “helpful” in determining whether the 
report was made in good faith.54   
Thus, the six justices comprising the plurality and dissent in 
Kidwell would seemingly disagree with the reasoning of the United 
States District Court in Freeman v. Ace Telephone Ass’n.55  In Freeman, 
 
 48. Id. at 239. 
 49. See id. at 242–43 (noting that in 2005, the rule was modified to contain 
both “claims” and “defenses”).   
 50. Id. at 243. 
 51. The dissent explicitly agreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the 
state’s whistleblower act does not create a “blanket job duties exception” and 
therefore does not prohibit an in-house attorney from bringing a claim under the 
act.  Id. at 235.  Without explicitly recognizing the principle, the six justices 
comprising the dissent and the plurality opinions seemingly rejected the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s holding in Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991), that 
in-house attorneys were per se barred from bringing a tort claim for retaliatory 
discharge.  Id. at 108–09. 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 879 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(recognizing that with a plurality opinion, the precedent established becomes the 
narrowest holding garnering a majority of votes).  
 53. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 226–27 (Gildea, J., plurality opinion), 235 
(Anderson, J., dissenting); see also id. at 229 (Gildea, J., plurality opinion) 
(agreeing with dissent that a routine report may be protected when the plaintiff’s 
contemporaneous intent in making the report is to blow the whistle).   
 54. See id. at 227 (Gildea, J., plurality opinion), 235 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 55. See Freeman v. Ace Tel. Ass’n, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1141 (D. Minn. 
2005).   
7
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the plaintiff, the co-CEO of his company, claimed that he was 
terminated after and because he claimed the company’s board of 
directors improperly sought mileage reimbursement for travel.56  
Notably, the plaintiff had provided notice to the board of other 
reimbursement issues in the same timeframe.57  Part of his job was 
approving reimbursements, leading the court to conclude that his 
communications did not satisfy the “good faith” requirement of the 
Minnesota Whistleblower Act.58 
The six justices comprising the plurality and dissent in Kidwell 
would seem to agree that, in Freeman, the sole fact that the plaintiff 
was carrying out his job responsibilities would be insufficient to 
deny him recovery under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act.59  
Although a plaintiff’s job responsibilities are relevant to determine 
whether he or she intended to expose an illegality in order to 
satisfy the Act’s “good faith” requirement,60 an employee can use 
other evidence to show that his or her report was made to expose 
an illegality.61   
Despite these agreed-upon principles, the Freeman court would 
still be on its own to determine whether the co-CEO created a fact 
question as to whether the purpose in his creating the report was to 
blow the whistle.62  Whether the court followed the Kidwell plurality 
or the dissenting opinions would essentially determine whether 
summary judgment would ever be appropriate.63  Following 
Kidwell’s plurality, the trial court could see from the facts that the 
plaintiff was carrying out his job duties and that he failed to meet 
the Huffman standards because the recipients of the report, namely 
the board itself, constituted “normal channels.”64  The Kidwell 
plurality would therefore agree that summary judgment was proper 
in Freeman.   
 
 
 56. Id. at 1132 (alleging that certain board members sought travel 
reimbursement for mileage incurred as a passenger in the vehicle, rather than the 
driver).  
 57. Id. at 1141. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 1131–32.  
 60. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220, 227 (Minn. 2010) (Gildea, J., 
plurality opinion), 235 (Anderson, J., dissenting).   
 61. See id. at 228–29 (Gildea, J., plurality opinion), 237–41 (Anderson, J., 
dissenting). 
 62. See id. at 227 (Gildea, J., plurality opinion). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 228–29.   
8
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The Kidwell dissent seemingly would see a fact question as to 
the plaintiff’s subjective intent.65  With the dissent’s lack of a 
framework, such as the one provided in Huffman,66 a plaintiff could 
presumably always create a fact question at the summary judgment 
stage by claiming that he had the “contemporaneous purpose of 
‘blowing the whistle’” based on the plaintiff’s self-serving subjective 
intent evidence.67  Notably and generally, “intent is a fact 
question.”68  Thus, under the dissent’s approach, summary 
judgment would rarely be granted unless the former employee 
surprisingly admitted that he did not intend to blow the whistle at 
the time of the report.69  Presumably, the dissenting justices would 
 
 65. See id. at 234–43 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 66. The Federal Circuit Court in Huffman created a framework for federal 
courts to apply the basic holding in Willis v. Dep’t of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 
1998).  See Huffman v. Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In Willis, the 
Federal Circuit Court “specifically held that an employee who makes disclosures as 
part of his normal duties cannot claim the protection of the WPA.”  Id. at 1352 
(citing Willis, 141 F.3d at 1144).  In explaining the phrase “normal duties,” the 
Huffman court presented three scenarios that might take place.  Id. at 1352–54.  
First, a federal employee who investigates and reports wrongdoing as part of his 
normal duties reports the wrongdoing “through normal channels.”  Id.  In light of 
Willis and the purpose behind the WPA, the Huffman court concluded that this 
activity is not protected under the Act.  Id.  Second, an employee with the same 
assigned responsibilities as the first scenario may report the wrongdoing “outside 
of normal channels.”  Id. at 1354.  The Huffman court suggested that an example 
of this situation could be a “law enforcement officer who is responsible for 
investigating crime by government employees who, feeling that the normal chain 
of command is unresponsive, reports wrongdoing outside of normal channels.”  
Id.  This activity, according to Huffman, is protected by the WPA.  Id.  Finally, the 
Huffman court recognized that an employee who is obligated to report the 
wrongdoing, but the report is not part of his normal duties or the employee was 
not actually assigned these duties, is also protected by the WPA.  Id.  
 67. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 239 (Minn. 2010) (Anderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 202 (Minn. 2000)); see also id. at 
238 (“The plurality also encroaches on the well-established role of the jury in 
determining subjective intent.”).   
 68. Cardot v. Synesi Group, Inc., No, A07-1868, 2008 LEXIS 1086, at *19 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Sackett v. Storm, 480 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Mar. 26, 1992)).   
 69. See id. (“Summary judgment is notoriously inappropriate for 
determination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith and other subjective 
feelings play dominant roles.” (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 538 
F.2d 180, 185 (8th Cir. 1976))); see also Cokley v. City of Otsego, 623 N.W.2d 625, 
630 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“Whether an employee made a report in ‘good faith’ 
is a question of fact, but the court may determine as a matter of law that certain 
conduct does not constitute a report for purposes of the Whistleblower Act.”) 
(citing Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 556 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996), review denied Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, 1997 LEXIS 148 (Minn. Feb. 26, 
1997)).   
9
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agree that in certain fact situations the plaintiff’s self-serving and 
subjective intent is not enough to cross this threshold.70  
Nevertheless, the dissent’s reliance on the ability of juries to 
determine subjective intent and the good faith nature behind any 
report suggests that these justices do not feel comfortable deciding 
this area of the law.71 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, the Kidwell decision leaves Minnesota courts 
and practitioners guessing at whether a plaintiff has created a fact 
question for juries in whistleblower claims where the employee’s 
job responsibilities involved reporting the unlawful activity and the 
report was made within normal channels.  Nevertheless, by 
rejecting the so called “job duties exception,”72 six justices have at 
least implicitly, and finally, recognized that in-house attorneys may 
bring retaliation claims under Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act.73  
Although many states have rejected the Illinois rule established in 
Balla,74 Minnesota has now joined the growing list of states that 
treat attorneys like other corporate employees.75  Whether this is 
good or bad for the legal profession as a whole is apparently a 
discussion the court is willing to have another day.76  
 
 70. See, e.g., Greene v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. A05-598, 2005 LEXIS 550, at 
*12–13 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2005) (recognizing that intent is only one factor in 
determining residency and therefore summary judgment is still possible when the 
issue of an individual’s subjective intent is raised).   
 71. See Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 242 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 72. See id. at 226–27 (Gildea, J., plurality opinion). 
 73. See id. at 239 n.4 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing Heckman v. Zurich 
Holding Co., 242 F.R.D. 606, 608–09 (D. Kan. 2007)).   
 74. See Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ill. 1991) (noting that in-
house counsel generally do not have a claim under the tort of retaliatory 
discharge). 
 75. See Heckman, 242 F.R.D. at 608–09 (collecting cases of states now permitting 
in-house attorneys to maintain retaliatory discharge claims under state law).   
 76. Presumably, the next fight in Minnesota involving in-house attorneys as 
whistle blowers will be over to what extent an attorney can use privileged or 
confidential information to support his or her claim.  Compare Heckman, 242 F.R.D. 
at 611 (permitting in-house attorney to bring retaliation claim under Kansas law 
and authorizing attorney to “reveal confidential information under Rule 1.6(b)(3) 
to the extent necessary to establish such [a] claim”), with Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal. 1994) (“[W]e conclude that there is no 
reason inherent in the nature of an attorney’s role as in-house counsel to a 
corporation that in itself precludes the maintenance of a retaliatory discharge 
claim, provided it can be established without breaching the attorney-client privilege or 
unduly endangering the values lying at the heart of the professional relationship.”). 
10
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